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Abstract 
This paper examines the financial sectors of Ghana, Kenya and Tanzania in relation to 
the regulation of microfinance institutions, specifically looking into client protection 
policies. The first section introduces the topic of microfinance in Sub-Saharan Africa, and 
the impact it has on the financial sector. A frame of reference is created by a brief 
introduction of the financial and regulatory climate in each of the three countries. 
Following this introduction, regression analyses demonstrate the impact of client 
protection policies on the performance of microfinance institutions in Ghana, Kenya, and 
Tanzania. 
Keywords: Microfinance, Client Protection, Sub-Saharan Africa  
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1. Introduction 
Financial institutions are powerful tools, essential for alleviating poverty in developing 
countries. Providing the much-needed access to credit and savings instruments allows the 
population to take control of their financial well-being.  Giving the impoverished the 
capability to balance their own budgets, and allocate their resources as they see fit can 
bring increased stability in income, and therefore greater quality of living. Many of the 
poor, notably those in rural areas, earn their living through seasonal ventures such as 
farming. In many African countries, small and medium sized enterprises account for 70% 
of GDP and employ up to 75% of the poor. (Oshadare & Apelogun)  These small 
business owners may prosper for a few months, and then experience a lull in their 
production and therefore income. Those who make the bulk of their profits during a short 
period of time, have to keep their money safe while rationing it for the future. Deposit-
taking institutions can protect their funds until they are ready to withdraw them. Another 
important service that many financial institutions offer is credit provision, which can 
supplement earnings in years or seasons where profits are low. In many countries in 
Africa, Microfinance Institutions (MFI’s), along with other Non-Bank Financial 
Institutions (NBFI’s) have grown exponentially in the last two decades. It has been 
reported that, “over 100 million customers worldwide borrow small loans from around 
10,000 MFIs.” (Barry & Tacneng, 2011) Many of these MFI’s are in Africa, and are 
attempting to fill gaps in the traditional banking sector. Studies have shown that countries 
who report larger microfinance industries tend to have lower levels of poverty. (Abdulai 
& Tewari, 2016) As this industry grows, governments are struggling to provide adequate 
regulations (Ndambu).  
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1.1 Types of Microfinance Institutions 
In general, MFI’s fall into one of three tiers based on level of formality. The tiers are 
outlined in Table 1, along with examples of institutions in each tier.  
Table 1: Tiers of MFIs 
Tier Description Examples of Institutions 
Formal These are the most 
regulated institutions, often 
under supervision of central 
banks. These organizations 
are generally focused on 
making a profit.  
Microfinance Banks, Rural 
Banks 
Semi-Formal These organizations are 
generally less regulated and 
are often the groups focused 
on the humanitarian aspects 
of microfinance.  
Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) 
Informal These groups are frequently 
unregulated, but are the 
most numerous. They are 
usually quite small and 
focus on local markets. 
Rotating Savings and Credit 
Associations (ROSCA), 
Local money lenders, Small 
Business Owners 
Source: (Oshadare & Apelogun) 
These institutions all operate at various levels of efficiency. It has been found that formal 
institutions are the most efficient, while informal are the least efficient, with an exception 
that NGOs are frequently among the most efficient NBFIs. (Abdulai & Tewari, 2016) 
1.2 Demand for Microfinance Institutions 
Using data from the Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) in 2010, the United 
Nations found that NGOs were the most widely used microfinance institutions, followed 
by cooperatives, NBFIs, then microfinance banks. (2013) The banks however reported 
the highest levels of growth. This data can be used to estimate the demand for various 
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types of MFIs, but it should be noted that MIX collects data that is self-reported from 
companies who choose to provide information, thus there may be biases in the data. One 
possible issue is that the organizations that are most likely to report to MIX are those who 
are performing well and operating efficiently, which as was previously mentioned, is the 
NGOs. This could skew the data and overestimate the ratio of NGO usage to other MFIs. 
Another important consideration is the lack of reporting by smaller NBFIs such as 
ROSCAs. These small, local groups do not provide information to MIX and therefore are 
unaccounted for in this measure of demand. (United Nation, 2013) Also, it is notable that 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) had the highest growth rate of depositors compared to other 
global regions around this time.  The two dominant types of loans in SSA are 
consumption loans (55%) and small business loans (40%). In 2018, MIX boasts data for 
309 MFIs in SSA, with $10.44 billion in their gross loan portfolios and 6.87 million 
active borrowers. (MIX) The MFIs who lend credit tend to focus on short-term loans in 
attempt to minimize risk. (Barry & Tacneng, 2011) The MFI market in SSA is growing 
rapidly, and the supply is ever increasing to match demand.  
1.3 Countries of Interest 
In 2008, seven countries received almost 50% of the total funding committed by various, 
largely non-commercial funders to MFIs in Sub Saharan Africa. These seven countries 
were Ghana, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Mali, and Mozambique. Over $75 
million was committed to each of the following countries: Ghana, Kenya, and Tanzania. 
(MIX & CGAP, 2008) These three countries have a large supply of funding for MFIs, 
along with various differences in their consumer protection policies. Comparing these 
three countries will provide us a good sample size with a reasonable number of data 
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points from various types and sizes of MFIs. The rest of the paper will be structured as 
follows: historical background, MFI statistics, regulations, and consumer protection 
sections for each of the three aforementioned countries, followed by the introduction to 
the data set, methodology, results and conclusion. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Importance of Regulation 
As MFIs establish an increased presence in SSA, the regulation of these organizations 
becomes an important topic of discussion. Many of these Microfinance Institutions focus 
on lending and taking deposits from the middle and lower classes. Often these lower 
income clients are viewed as risky, especially in countries that do not currently have a 
method of credit reporting. Frequently, when lenders are unsure of the borrower’s ability 
to pay back the loans they charge higher interest rates, which can in turn hurt those who 
are borrowing the funds. There are a multitude of other examples of issues that may arise 
when proper regulations are not in place. These problems can negatively impact the 
clients as well as the MFIs themselves.  
One approach to regulation is to establish separate legislation for MFIs. As of 
2008, there were 29 countries in SSA that had created specialized MFI legislation, 14 that 
grouped MFIs with other banks and put them under already established banking 
regulations, and 3 countries reported no regulation of MFIs. (Ndambu). Occasionally 
governments will create specialized bodies to supervise the practices of MFIs. (Oshadare 
& Apelogun)   
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Many recommend that countries impose strict regulations with punishments for 
those institutions that do not comply. One of the biggest flaws with this plan is that 
frequently, countries do not have the means to enforce the regulations. (Oshadare & 
Apelogun)  There is also the matter of balancing regulations that are vital versus those 
that create significant barriers to entry for new organizations. These countries do not want 
to deter MFIs by making their markets too troublesome to enter. (Ali 2015)   
Regulations are intended to keep the financial sector functional and healthy. The 
government walks the line between over regulation with potential harms to the MFIs and 
under regulation with potential harms to the consumer. MFIs generally have their own 
risk aversion strategies and crisis handling capabilities. Consumers on the other hand, are 
inherently less protected and are individually less powerful than these organizations. It is 
vital that the government establishes regulations that will protect their citizens and allow 
them to participate in the financial markets in a safe, low risk manner.  
In 2006 there were 8 MFIs in Rwanda that were forcibly closed down due to 
“gross mismanagement, poor credit management practices, failure to meet minimal 
conditions for licensing, and loss of customer confidence.” (United Nations, 2013) This 
eye-opening news serves as a call to action. In efforts to help alleviate poverty and 
establish a stable financial sector, some institutions were allowing customers to accrue 
massive amounts of debt. Some also had convoluted pricing structures, were using unfair 
methods of collecting loan payments, and were operating in all around unethical ways. 
(United Nations, 2013)  Customer protection regulations have been written up, but in 
many countries these laws are still in the process of being approved and amended. (GIZ 
2011) Some important areas of consumer protection include: transparency, fair and 
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appropriate treatment of clients, data privacy measures, and methods to handle consumer 
complaints. (United Nations, 2013)  These sorts of regulations will not only allow 
consumers to make smart choices, but also they will establish a sense of trustworthiness 
in the MFIs. Consumers will feel more comfortable using their services when they do not 
hear stories of their relatives and neighbors being deceived or abused for profits. (GIZ 
2011) 
 These consumer protections have especially come into question recently as the 
digital financial market has grown significantly over the past few years. Financial Service 
Providers (FSPs) moving to online platforms increase the ease of access and inclusion of 
people who may not live in locations with physical branches of MFIs or traditional banks. 
It is however, quite easy to con people on digital platforms. There is also an increased 
security threat when providing personal data online to companies you may not know 
much about. One study found that the privacy policies of international digital lending 
institutions, 55% of which were sampled from SSA, were written at an average reading 
level of grade 13. (Traynor, 2018) This statistic is particularly worrisome when you 
consider the average level of education of the clients these services are intended for. It 
becomes obvious that these privacy policies are not meant to be read and understood by 
those agreeing to them, which creates large issues for consumers who think they are safe 
disclosing personal information to the online service providers.  
The same study looked into how secure the mobile applications for these FSPs 
are. They found many concerning issues in regards to securing consumer data. Some 
applications were even vulnerable to an attack from a third party, impersonating the 
server and therefore accessing consumer data they should not be privy to. (Traynor, 
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2018)  These results are concerning, and it is vital that governments step in to protect 
their citizens and ensure that they are not allowing unfair and unsafe practices in their 
countries. The question is then, how do consumer protection regulations impact the 
MFIs? 
Some researchers were interested in testing the impact of increased regulation on 
the performance of MFIs. The results show that public auditing has a positive impact on 
MFI performance, while general banking regulations and rating systems show no 
significant impact on the performance of these institutions. (Barry & Tacneng, 2011)  
Others have found that external governance has a positive impact on profitability and 
self-sufficiency, while negatively impacting depth of outreach. (Barry & Tacneng, 2011). 
2.2 Ghana  
a. MFI Environment in Ghana 
Ghana has a strong past in finance in Africa, as it is suggested that the first credit union in 
Africa was established there in 1955. Various other types of financial institutions have 
blossomed in the country since that time including rural and community banks, savings 
and loan companies, SuSus, which are informal loan clubs originating from Nigeria, and 
other NBFIs. (Bank of Ghana, 2007) Although financial institutions have been around for 
many decades in Ghana, they experienced slow growth for a long time. Recently, there 
was a period of rapid growth in the early 2000’s, when the number of loans from NBFI’s 
quadrupled in a matter of five years. (Bank of Ghana, 2007)  This stimulated demand for 
some sort of solid regulatory framework, but these laws are still evolving and have not 
seen very much change since around this time period.  
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In 2017 there were 566 MFIs of various types according to the Bank of Ghana 
(BoG), but this figure does not reflect the informal MFIs that were not reported directly 
to the BoG. The estimates are observable in Table 2. (Bank of Ghana, July 2017) These 
data do not capture every MFI, but do include the vast majority.  
Table 2: MFI Break Down in Ghana 
Year Type of MFI Quantity 
Informal 
(Data from 2009) 
Credit Unions 529 
SuSu Collectors 1,500-4,500 
Formal and Semi-Formal 
 (Data from 2012) 
Microfinance Companies 484 
Moneylending Companies 70 
Financial NGOs 12 
Source: (Bank of Ghana, July 2017) and (GIZ 2011) 
Table 3 contains information about the kinds of financial institutions different groups of 
the population were using as of 2009. Examining the data provides evidence that 
although there are many services offered, there is still a large portion of the population 
who cannot take advantage of these institutions, predominantly those in rural areas.  
Table 3: MFI Usage in Ghana 
MFI Tier Urban Rural Total 
Formal 52% 21% 34% 
Semi-Formal 9% 5% 7% 
Informal 11% 18% 15% 
No Usage (due to choice or lack of access) 29% 55% 44% 
Source (GIZ 2011) 
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b. Client Protection in Ghana 
In general, the areas of client protection that are emphasized in Ghana are the safety of 
the deposits and the protection of client information. These are very important parts of 
client protection, but they are not thoroughly developed, nor is there much breadth of 
regulation. There are other areas of protection as well that are less rigorously regulated 
than what we see in western countries. The Bank of Ghana has set forth some 
requirements for transparency of MFIs to help consumers. They have also established a 
credit reporting system for FSPs to submit credit information on borrowers. These steps 
will help form a stable financial market in Ghana, but enforcing the regulations is still an 
issue. There has also been an increase in customer complaints, almost doubling from 265 
cases in 2005 to 508 cases in 2008. (GIZ 2011) This is a sign that although regulations 
are improving, there is still much room for amelioration. The power of the regulations 
seems to be largely nominal at this time. In 2016 there was a code created that outlined 
proper ways to handle consumer complaints, which extended to the online FSPs, a 
frequently neglected market. (Bank of Ghana, Feb. 2017) It is also important to note that 
there are two microfinance facilitators currently in Ghana who are in the midst of 
campaigns to teach their customers financial literacy. (Center for Financial Inclusion) 
Programs like these can greatly benefit consumers and assist them in making informed 
decisions. Educating clients on how to decide the size of the loan they need, or teaching 
them budgeting techniques are very small steps can help them avoid over-indebtedness 
which will be better for not only themselves, but the institutions they borrow from in the 
long run as well.  
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2.3 Kenya  
a. MFI Environment in Kenya  
In the 1980’s and 1990’s, Kenya developed policies that were aimed at liberalizing their 
financial markets. This allowed for the establishment and growth of MFIs, insurance 
companies, and a stock exchange. NBFIs grew rapidly, soon passing up the number of 
commercial banks, so by 1994, Kenya boasted 50 NBFIs whose cumulative deposits were 
equivalent to 14% of the country’s GDP. (Brownbridge,1996) Commercial banks held 
more cumulative deposits even though there were less of them.  In 2006 the formal 
process for licensing and regulating MFIs was placed under the responsibility of the 
Central Bank of Kenya. The SACCO Act of 2009 started turning SACCOs (Savings and 
Credit Cooperative Organizations) into formal, regulated financial institutions. 2010 is 
when mobile financial services started to rapidly increase in popularity in Kenya. M-
PESA, owned by Safaricom and Vodafone, is the predominant mobile FSP in the Kenyan 
market, offering services like fund transfers and banking services. (GIZ 2011) This was 
also the time period around which lenders started using systems of credit reporting, 
accessible to other FSPs. (Central Bank of Kenya) Although Kenya now has one of the 
most developed financial systems in Sub Saharan Africa, they still face issues with 
corruption and lack of supervision. (GIZ 2011) 
In Kenya, MFI usage statistics have changed greatly over the last few years as 
mobile financial services have become popular and accessible. Since Kenya has started 
formalizing SACCOs, that also increases the ratio of formal and semi-formal institutions 
to informal institutions in comparison with many other countries in SSA who categorize 
SACCOs into their informal financial markets. The quantity of each type of formal and 
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semi-formal MFI in Kenya is listed below in Table 4. There were additional types of 
institutions, including the informal institutions, for which data was not available.  
Table 4: MFI Break Down in Kenya 
Tier Institution Type Quantity  
Formal Commercial Banks 44 
Mortgage Finance Companies 2 
Foreign Exchange Bureaus 130 
Deposit Taking MFIs 3 
Deposit Taking SACCOs (estimate) 215 
Semi-Formal Non-Deposit Taking SACCOs 3,000-5,000 
Source (GIZ 2011) 
 
In Kenya, commercial banks and informal MFIs are the most frequently used FSPs, 
though usage of all types of MFIs has increased in the last decade. In Table 5, data is 
shown that compares the usage of different types of FSPs over the period of 2006 to 
2016. It is important to note that the mobile financial services have grown much faster 
than any other type of service, but have not kept the other types of FSPs from growing. 
This is a sign that in general, the financial market as a whole is still growing in Kenya, 
which heightens the need for regulation and consumer protection as more and more 
citizens are becoming involved.  
 
 
 
MFI CLIENT PROTECTION REGULATIONS IN GHANA, KENYA, AND TANZANIA 
	 16	
Table 5: Usage in Kenya 
Institution Type 2006 2009 2013 2016 
Bank 14% 21% 29% 38% 
SACCO 13% 9% 11% 13% 
Other Informal 32% 36% 28% 41% 
Mobile N/A 28% 62% 71% 
Source: (Central Bank of Kenya, 2016() 
 b. Client Protection in Kenya 
The topic of client protection contains a vast array of strategies and techniques to make 
consumers feel secure using your services, that way they will choose to do business with 
your institution. One way to examine the success of client protection programs could be 
to look at data measuring the level of trust that consumers have in various financial 
institutions. The Central Bank of Kenya published a table with the trust levels of their 
citizens in their FSPs. This data showed that commercial banks were the most trusted by 
rural and urban populations. For both of these groups, mobile financial services were the 
second most trusted, but fascinatingly enough, when examining specifically mobile bank 
accounts, one can see that these are the least trusted. It is also important to note that urban 
citizens generally have greater trust in financial institutions across the board. The 
percentage of rural citizens who said they do not trust any financial institutions was 
almost twice as high as this statistic for the urban demographic. (Central Bank of Kenya, 
2016)  
 Frequently MFIs and banks are subject to the same level of regulation in Kenya. 
The Central Bank of Kenya has many methods in which it attempts to monitor FSPs, but 
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they face a variety of issues when it comes to enforcing these rules. One example is that 
when the CBK asks FSPs to report certain information to them, such as the bank fees, 
there is no standardized method that they ask them to follow. (GIZ 2011) This could be a 
problem because institutions may be able to manipulate their numbers in a direction that 
is more beneficial for them. The Central Bank of Kenya also attempts to handle some 
disputes because they do not have rules for providing dispute resolution, but they can 
only take so many cases. (GIZ 2011) One more area that Kenya chooses to regulate 
heavily when it comes to MFIs is their advertising. There are regulations in place that 
help stop misleading advertising campaigns from FSPs. The Central Bank of Kenya is 
trying to protect their citizens from being taken advantage of, but it will be compelling to 
see how regulations are adapted in reaction to the recent expansion of mobile financial 
services.  
2.4 Tanzania 
 a. MFI Environment in Tanzania 
In Tanzania, the financial sector has been evolving rapidly since the 1980’s and 1990’s 
when the government started to enact reforms that reduced barriers to entry, allowing for 
significant growth in the private sector. Shortly after these changes, the government also 
privatized the commercial banks they owned. Then, they increased the regulatory power 
of the Bank of Tanzania (BoT) over MFI’s. (Chuku & Ndanshau, 2016) In the 1990’s, the 
financial sector grew from 10 institutions to almost 800, and by 1998 they had 
established a stock exchange. (Gallardo et al. 2005) More recently, there has recently 
been a push to formalize rural and community MFIs, as well as NGOs, so they could be 
licensed and regulated. This would likely have a noticeable effect on SACCOs, which are 
MFI CLIENT PROTECTION REGULATIONS IN GHANA, KENYA, AND TANZANIA 
	 18	
the most popular form of MFI in Tanzania, as well as organizations like the Foundation 
for International Community Assistance, a microloan provider operating with funding 
from donors. (Gallardo et al. 2005) 
In Tanzania, the financial sector has been developing quickly, but there are still 
some types of institutions that do not exist in large numbers. As with Ghana and Kenya, 
smaller, more local institutions have the most clients in total. Table 6 contains data 
showing the number of recorded institutions for each type of FSP in Tanzania, excluding 
informal institutions, of which the quantities are unknown.  
Table 6: MFI Break Down in Tanzania 
Tier Institution Quantity 
Formal Commercial Banks 27 
Financial Institutions 13 
Foreign Exchange Bureaus 176 
Semi-Formal SACCOS 2,500-5,200 
Financial NGOs 5 
Source: (GIZ 2011) 
The number of financial institutions in Tanzania does not seem to be correlated with the 
number clients each type has. For example, there are many more informal institutions 
than formal, but a larger percent of the population reports holding accounts at formal 
MFIs. Table 7 includes data about the percentage of users in each tier of Microfinance 
Institutions in Tanzania, excluding Zanzibar.  
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Table 7: Usage in Tanzania 
Tier % of Adults Using MFI Type 
Formal 9% 
Semi-Formal 4% 
Informal 35% 
No Usage (due to choice or lack of access) 52% 
Source (GIZ 2011) 
 b. Client Protection in Tanzania 
Generally the Bank of Tanzania is responsible for the external regulation of MFIs, which 
means that they have significant power over the steps these FSPs are taking to protect the 
clients they serve. The overarching microfinance regulations require some sort of contract 
between the service provider and the client. These contracts must include things like the 
interest rate for loans, which the provider may not change without first consulting the 
client. (GIZ 2011) The BoT, in 2006, set up a credit reporting system to assist financial 
institutions with the decision of which clients to take on. This helps consumers as well 
because clients who take out loans from a multitude of FSPs, accumulating significant 
amounts of debt, hurt themselves in the long run due to the fact that they are unable to 
repay the loans. (Boston University) They also implemented the Fair Competition Act, 
which helps prevent monopolies from taking over and charging outrageous prices for 
their services with unreasonably high interest rates. (GIZ 2011) These regulations ensure 
a certain degree of client protection from potential abuses of MFIs.  
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3. Hypothesis and Methodology 
In looking at the affects of increased client protection regulations, it would be useful to 
assess the potential impacts of on the efficiency of MFIs. In analyzing data from the 
Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX), we have access to various performance 
indicators, as well as what types of client protection individual MFIs offer. By comparing 
performance over time to the increase in consumer protection regulation, which was the 
result of increased regulatory laws in all three of these countries, we can attempt to draw 
some conclusions about how increased client protection affects the MFIs. In order to 
examine this, we can test the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis: An increase in client protection policies does not negatively impact 
the performance and efficiency of individual MFIs in Sub Saharan Africa.  
 
If client protection measures have no effect or a positive effect on MFIs, then it is 
worthwhile for them to enact these policies. One of the reasons to believe increasing 
client protection would have no effect or a positive affect is that these protection 
measures allow the MFIs to attract more clients. More people will trust them and feel 
secure using their financial services, so they can attract more business. Another reason to 
anticipate that performance may be positively correlated with client protection policies is 
that the consumers who are more risk averse are less likely to use financial services they 
see as unsafe. This means that those consumers would likely not use the financial 
services of MFIs without protection measures in place. The clients that unregulated MFIs 
could expect to see may be riskier and less likely to pay back loans. If this is true, 
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regulations could help attract better clients, therefore reducing the risk the business takes 
on, and in turn, increasing their performance. Finally, many client protection measures 
focus on measuring a client’s risk of over-indebtedness, which would be beneficial for 
the MFIs to be aware of before choosing whether or not to allow a potential client to use 
their services. For these reasons, it is plausible that consumer protection regulations will 
have no negative impact on MFI performance.  
 To test this hypothesis, we can examine the data from MIX to compare the growth 
of consumer protection regulations to the performance of MFIs over time. The time 
period examined in this study is 2009-2014. Data was gathered at the institutional level in 
each of the three countries discussed in this paper and compared. The client protection 
measures served as the independent variables. Three measures of client protection were 
used in this study providing the following independent variables: 
 
IAVOP: Internal Audits Verify Over-indebtedness Protection - This accounted 
for whether or not the MFIs were screening clients before taking them on.   
 
CDCP: Clear Debt Collection Practices – This variable measured whether or not 
the MFIs had well outlined debt collection practices. This variable was used to 
represent the degree to which the MFIs had policies that their clients could 
understand. 
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FCCS: Functioning Client Complaint System – This helps measure the ability of 
clients to resolve any disputes that may arise in regards to the financial services 
they are utilizing.  
  
To examine the effect of these variables on MFIs, I chose several performance 
indicators below. These data, which serve as our dependent variables, are various 
measures in which it is possible to note the change in performance of MFIs over time. 
Each of these variables was logged to minimize skewness.  
 
LOG Assets: Assets - MIX Market defines assets as the “total value of resources 
controlled by the Financial Services Providers,” which can measure the overall 
financial wellbeing of these institutions.  
 
LOG DPSM: Depositors Per Staff Member - This is the ratio of depositors to 
staff members, which can provide a measure of efficiency within the MFI. 
 
LOG GLP: Gross Loan Portfolio - This is the value of outstanding loan 
principles, which can be used to gauge the amount of business an MFI is 
conducting.  
 
LOG NUM DA: Number of Deposit Accounts - This is the number of deposit 
accounts that each MFI is liable to pay back. This is also an indicator of the 
amount of business each MFI is getting. 
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In order to conduct the experiment, I ran a regression with time fixed effects and country 
fixed effects. I ran the regression four times, regressing each dependent variable on the 
three client protection variables, incorporating the aforementioned fixed effects.  
4. Results 
The results of the regressions are included on the following pages in Tables 8-11. In 
examining these data points, we see that many of the coefficients are positive and 
statistically significant, which indicates that we can reject a null hypothesis, so client 
protection programs do indeed have an overall positive relationship with MFI 
performance. When examining the individual client protection policies however, it is 
notable that the “internal audits verify over-indebtedness” variable’s coefficient was 
negative in each regression, and generally very significant. The “functional client 
complaint system” seems to have a positive and significant correlation with MFI 
performance. Our third client protection variable, “clear debt collection practices” was 
always positive, although never significant. Following the tables, I will discuss some of 
the potential flaws in this experiment.  
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One of the potential drawbacks to the data used in this study is that the sample size was 
very small relative to the number of MFIs in each of these countries. One reason why this 
may be the case is that the data from MIX is self-reported, so many institutions, 
especially smaller ones, do not provide them any data. This can also cause problems in 
that the institutions that are well run are the ones most likely to provide information. 
FSPs who are struggling or do not treat their clients well, are unlikely to submit that to 
MIX. One potential solution to the small sample size would be to look at MFI level data 
for larger regions of Africa, rather than specific countries. This could also help normalize 
any countries who may have a better than average financial sector.  
7. Conclusion 
This experiment provided very interesting results, and there is a significant number of 
questions that it brings up, however. The first question is: why there is a negative 
relationship between the over-indebtedness checks and performance of an MFI? I 
hypothesized that over-indebtedness checks would benefit institutions because they 
would not provide loans to clients who are less likely to pay them back. The negative 
impact could stem from the fact that turning away clients would lower their gross loan 
portfolio, even though the loans they do make might be more likely to be paid back. 
Another area of interest that could be further explored would be case studies for an in-
depth look at the performance of a few MFIs over time. Some MFIs have consistently 
provided data since far before 2009, but not very many, so those years were not included. 
Looking back at the country level research however, many changes to MFI regulations 
were made in the first decade of the 2000’s, so if we could examine data from further 
before the regulations, we may see a larger impact on performance. Finally, it would be 
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ideal to capture data from more semi-formal and informal institutions, which were not 
well represented in this sample. Unfortunately, data from these institutions is much 
harder to come by. If smaller, less regulated institutions with fewer client protection 
policies perform worse than these sampled MFIs, we could see a greater impact of these 
client protection variables on the performance. These protection policies help clients 
establish a sense of trust in the institutions they are putting their money into, and in the 
long run this will improve the financial sector in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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